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DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

D

URING the past twenty years there has been a great
deal of controversy concerning the advisability of
completely abolishing federal jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship. Due to the fact that wealthy corporations sometimes abused this privilege, various attempts were
made by the state legislatures to prevent the removal of cases
to the federal courts, and in some instances they were successful, although the constitutionality of such statutes was attacked.1 Typical of the state statutes preventing removal of
cases to the federal courts was the Arkansas statute. According to this statute, if a corporation, when sued in a state
court, removed the case to the federal court on the ground of
diversity of citizenship, the corporation lost its license to do
business in Arkansas. Hence, if it wanted to do business in
Arkansas, it had to submit to the jurisdiction of the Arkansas courts. This was actually the statute involved in the
famous Terral case 2 which came before the United States
Supreme Court in 1922 and in which the court, overruling
the earlier cases to the contrary, held the statute unconstitutional. It was squarely decided, Chief Justice Taft delivI Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. $35, 24 L. ed. 148 (1876); Security
Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246, 50 L. ed. 1013 (1905).
2 Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U. S. 529 (1922).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

ering the opinion, that the state legislature cannot constitutionally prevent any person from resorting to the federal
courts when, under the congressional enactment, he would
have a right to do so.
The natural result of this decision was of course a more
rigorous attempt to change the congressional enactment,
thus transferring the battleground from the state legislature
to Congress. Many bills have been introduced in Congress
from time to time whose purpose is materially to limit or
totally abolish diversity jurisdiction. At the last Congress, Senator Norris introduced a bill providing for the
amendment of the judicial code by simply striking out the
provisions relating to suits between citizens of different
states. Another bill limited the jurisdiction by denying the
right of removal to a corporation doing business in the
state where it is sued. Still another bill proposed to raise the
jurisdictional amount from the present requirement of
$3,000 to $10,000.' Although the advocates of the proposed
legislation did not succeed in the last Congress, their persistent and determined effort indicates that the matter will
again be presented at the present session. It may therefore
be interesting and helpful to consider the chief arguments
for and against such legislation with a view to determining
their validity.
The advocates of the change have of course the burden of
establishing its desirability. Looking at the situation from
the standpoint of those who advocate the change, we may,
for the purpose of convenient discussion, divide their arguments into those which purport to answer the objections to
the new legislation and those which purport to state its advantages.
s Howland, Shal Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies Between Citizens oj
Different States be Preserved? 18 Am. BAR Ass's. JouR. 436, 499; 14 AM. BAR

Ass'x. Joun. 200.
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1.

OmGIN.

REASON

Perhaps the objection most frequently made is that the
original reason for granting diversity jurisdiction still exists.
What was this reason? "Why is it that a United States Court
is given the duty of administering the law of another jurisdiction? Why did the states allow it? Why was it important
that the United States should have it?" The question was
thus stated long ago,4 without, however, answering it. It
has sometimes been said that the real reason was the fear
of the state legislatures. And it seems that statutes had been
passed in a number of states in regard to paper money which
placed the nonresident creditor somewhat at a disadvantage.
Hence there was a desire to protect him against these unfair legal tender and stay laws of the states by giving him
access to the federal courts.' Thus, a recent writer, after discussing these statutes, concludes: "In summary we may say
that the desire to protect creditors against legislation favorable to debtors was a principal reason for the grant of diversity jurisdiction." 6 But, according to what this same writer
concedes to be the "orthodox view," 7 the principal reason for
inserting this clause in the constitution was based on what
he calls the "local prejudice theory" I which became famous
by Chief Justice Marshall's elaboration of it in The Bank
of the United States v. Deveaux, -a case that came before
him in 1809. He declared that, however true it may be that
state tribunals will administer justice as impartially as those
of the nation, yet it is also true that the constitution entertains apprehensions on this subject or views, with indulgence
the fears and apprehensions of nonresident suitors.' 0 Seven
4 Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 4.HARv. L. REv. 311; 316.
5 Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciary Act of 1789, 37

H~Av. L. REv. 49, 82; Johnson, State Laws and Federal Courts, 17 Ky. L. JouR.
355, 356.
e Friendly, Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HAav. L. REv. 483,
496.

I Friendly, supra note 6, at 501.
. Friendly, supra note 6, at 509; Warren, supra note 5, at 83.
9 5 Cranch 61 (1809).
10 The Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,

5 Cranch 61, 87 (1809).
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years later Justice Story expressed the same view. Speaking
for the Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee 11 he said that
state prejudices, jealousies, interests and attachments might
sometimes obstruct or control the administration of justice
or be supposed to do so and for this reason the constitution
enables the nonresident to have his case tried and determined
in the federal court. To the student of constitutional history,
it is not surprising that our forefathers should have entertained theseapprehensions. The conflict of interest, strongly
emphasized by intercolonial jealousy, had endangered the
revolutionary cause and threatened to disrupt the constitutional convention. It was only natural that the .constitution
should emerge as a compromise of conflicting interests and
fears. 12

Now, the argument is made that this reason has long ago
become obsolete and that there is no longer any appreciable
danger of local prejudice in the state courts. The mobility
of modem life, says Felix Frankfurter, perhaps the foremost champion of the change, has greatly weakened state
attachments. Since the adoption of the constitution, this
country has undergone such a radical economic transformation that practically all danger of discrimination against nonresident litigants has disappeared.18 He also points out that
Congress has shown its confidence in the impartiality of the
state courts in those very cases where local prejudice, if any
exists, may be presumed to be strongest, cases against corporate defendants. The Employers' Liability Act of 1908
gave concurrent jurisdiction to state and federal courts of
the cases arising under it. But Congress very soon checked
the heavy flow of employer liability litigation which came
to the federal courts by prohibiting the removal of such
cases from the state courts.14
11 1 Wheat. 304 (1816).
12 Collier, A Plea Against Jurisdiction for Diversity of Citiznship, 76 CENT.
L. JOUR. 263, 264.
18 Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States qsd

States Courts, 13 Com. L. QuTAR. 499, 521.
14 Frankfurter, supra note 13, at 522.
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There has, however, been a very vigorous dissent from
this view, especially by the American Bar Association.
Speaking on this subject before the Association in 1922,
Chief Justice Taft said:
"I venture to think that there may be a strong dissent from the
view that danger of local prejudice in state courts against nonresidents
is at an end. Litigants from the eastern part of the country who are
expected to invest their capital in the West or South will hardly con-cede the proposition that their interests as creditors will be as sure of
impartial judicial consideration in a western or southern state court
as in a federal court." 15'

The Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the
American Bar Association is in perfect accord with Chief
Justice Taft on this question. In its report to the Association
at its meeting in 1928, the Committee makes this strong
statement:
"A man would be blind to the conditions in different parts of this
country who did not realize that attachments, prejudices and jealousies
and differing social, economic and political views continue to influence
...
lawyers, judges and jurymen, when they are called upon to adjudicate upon the rights of citizens from distant states. It is not necessary to charge an unjust point of view in fellow-Americans living in
different parts of the country. But that marked differences of outlook
and opinion exist which influence both legislation and judicial proceedings, especially when: the interests of nonresidents are involved, is undeniable." 16

The law faculty of University of Chicago, giving their opinion as impartial observers, have supported this view. 7 The
courts, too, have pretty consistently continued to affirm this
theory. 8
15 Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in the Administration of Justice in
the Federal Courts, 47 Am. BAR AssN. REP. 250, 258, 259.
16 53 AM. BAR Ass'N. REP. 434; 14 Au. BAR ASSN. JOURL 267; 63 CONG.
RC. 8079.

17' Comment, 31 MicH. L. REv. 59,. 61.
18 Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 334 (1855); Scott v. Sanford, 19 How.
393, 580 (1856) ; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 34 (1882) ; Langford v. Platte
Iron Works, 235 U. S. 461 (191S); Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v-Butte Cop-

per Co., 200 Fed. 808, 811 (D.'C. Mont. 1912); Barron Steamship to. v. Kane,
170 U. S. 100, 111 (1898); Feister v. Hulck, 228 Fed. 821 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1916).
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2. TnE EcoNmmic ARGUMENT
Another objection against the proposed legislation is that
it would discourage the investment of eastern capital in the
western and southern sections of the country. In referring
to the development in these sections of the country, the
Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the American Bar Association has this to say:
"Investments have been made, not alone in the securities of the
great systems of railroads, but in industrial projects having plants,
works and mines in states other than those where the security holders
reside. Billions of eastern capital have been invested in western banks,
trust companies, and mortgage companies ;nd have been loaned on
farm mortgages, livestock and crops of all kinds. When nonresident
investors learn that they must in an emergen.cy depend on the state
courts to protect their interests, the confidence which for generations
has been based on the security afforded by the right to resort to"the
federal courts will be seriously impaired. And a serious blow will be
directed at the financial structure which has been built up in a long
course pf years; and this blow will be reflected not only in the restriction of investments and loans, but also in the increase in the rate of
interest, especially on farm mortgages." 19

In a very widely quoted passage of his address to the Association, Chief Justice Taft expressed the same view:
"The material question is not so much whether the justice administered is actually impartial and fair, as it is whether it is thought to
be so by those who are considering the wisdom of investing their capital
in states where that capital is needed for the promotion of enterprises
and industrial and commercial progress. No single element-and I want
to emphasize this because I don't think it is always thought of-no
single element in our governmen-tal system has done so much to secure
capital for the legitimate development of enterprises throughout the
West and South as the existence of federal courts there, with juris20
diction to hear diverse citizenship cases."

Now, personally, I am not in favor of abolishing diversity
jurisdiction completely, but I must confess that this eco19 69 CONG. REc. 8079; 53 AM. BAR Ass'N. REP. 435; 14 AM. BAR Ass'N.
JouR. 267.
20 Taft, supra note 15, at 259; 14 AM. BA Ass's. JouR. 200; Newlin, Pro-

posed Linitations Upon Our Federal Courts, 1S Am. BAR Ass'x. JOUR. 401, 403;
Parker, The FederalJurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 Am. BAR Ass'N.
JouR. 433, 439.
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nomic argument, in spite of the eminence of its sponsors,
does not appeal to me very strongly. It seems clear, as Mr.
Frankfurter has pointed out, that bankers and still less investors do not contemplate litigation for default when they
make their loans. What rate they get depends on the money
market and the credit of the borrowers. Moreover the argument leaves wholly out of account our economic transformation. With the "wide diffusion of securities throughout the
country, customer ownership of utility stock, employee holdings in large corporations," 2 our economic situation has
radically changed. The financing of southern and western
development is being increasingly done by local capital.
These changes are highly significant.
3. CONSTITUTIONALITY
A third objection to the proposed legislation is its alleged
unconstitutionality. There does not seem to be much foundation for this argument, and yet it is made by so eminent a
jurist as Gurney E. Newlin, President of the American Bar
Association in 1929, and also by the Association's Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform.22 The lower federal
courts came into existence and acquired their jurisdiction
by an Act of Congress, which in turn received from the Constitution the power to create them and to confer on them
a limited jurisdiction. Section 2, Article 3, of the Constitution, enumerates various classes of cases to which the federal
judicial power shall extend and then expressly limits the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to cases affecting foreign officials and cases to which a state is a party.
Where then is the original jurisdiction in the other enumerated cases? According to Section 1, the judicial power in
these cases is to be vested in such inferior courts as Congress may ordain and establish. Now as a matter of strict
construction, it might perhaps be argued that by these pro21 Frankfurter, supra note 13, at 522.
22 Newlin, supra note 20, at 404; Howland, supra note 3, at 503.
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visions the Constitution vested the federal courts with jurisdiction in all the enumerated cases "in the same automatic
fashion in which the Statute of Uses executed a use." 2 This
argument was in fact made by counsel in the interesting case
of Turner v. Bank of North America.24
Closely allied to this theory was the view that the Constitution did not leave it within the discretion of Congress
to withhold any part of the judicial power which it was
authorized to confer on the federal courts. According to this
view, the federal courts derive their power from Congress,
not immediately from the Constitution, but that Congress
was under a duty to confer full jurisdiction.
Although this latter view was supported by all the learning and influence of Justice Story, 5 it fared no better than
the former view. Both have been disregarded and repudiated
congressionally and judicially. The whole history of congressional legislation on this subject shows that in determining the scope of federal jurisdiction, Congress has always been guided, not by the mandate of the Constitution,
but by consiftltions -of policy and. expediency. The Supreme Court has also repeatedly rejected the idea that it
derives its jurisdiction immediately from the Constitution or
that Congress lacks discretion in granting it. The "truth
is," said Mr. Justice Chase, "that the disposal of the judicial
power belongs to Congress. If Congress has given the power
to this court, we possess it, not otherwise ....
Congress is
not bound.., to enlarge the jurisdiction ... to every sub-

ject.. . which the constitution might warrant." 2 6 In a case
decided in 1922,27 Justice Sutherland went even further than
this when he declared:
Friendly, supra note 6, at 506.
24 4 Dall. 8 (1799).
25 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, op. cit. supra note 11, at 328; White v. Fenner, Fed. Cas. No. 17547 (1818).
26 Turner v. Bank of North America, op. cit. supra note 24, at 10.
27 Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922).
28

DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
"The constitution simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity
to take jurisdiction in the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of
Congress to confer it ... And the jurisdiction, having been conferred,
may, at the will of Congress, be taken away in whole or in part..."

Even Chief Justice Taft, who was always strongly opposed
to any restriction of federal jurisdiction, frankly admitted 28
that "taking away of fundamental jurisdiction from the federal courts is within the power of Congress.. ." So it seems
fairly well-settled that the Constitution merely fixes the maximum of federal jurisdiction, not the minimum, and that consequently Congress may, within that maximum, restrict or
enlarge the jurisdiction ad libitum.29
4. ADVANTAGES OF THE FEDERAL COURT
There is a fourth objection to the proposed legislation.
It is said that it would deprive many litigants of the advantage of a trial in the federal court and that this would
be a serious loss in the administration of Jifstice, because federal courts have a great advantage over state courts in the
matter of composition and procedure. The point is made
that an appointed judge is as a rule considerably superior
to an elected judge for two reasons: First, because the person making the appointment usually gives much more consideration to the qualities that are desirable for judicial office, but which are of little consequence where the office is
elective, since these qualities inherently lack popular appeal; and, Second, because a judge holding office for life,
or during good behavior, is not hampered with periodical
campaigns for reelection or with the necessity of keeping
his political fences in repair. Furthermore, it is argued that
not only is the federal judge a more capable man, but there
is one rule of procedure which makes the federal court a
28 Taft, supra note 15, at 259.

29 Kline v. Burke 'Construction Co., op. dt. supra note 27; United States
v. Haynes, 29 Fed. 691, 696 (D. C. Mass. 1887); Toledo Fence & Post Co. v.
Lyons, 290 Fed. 637, 644 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923); Manley v. Olney, 32 Fed. 708
(C. C. W. D. Mich. 1887); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 235 (1845); Stevenson v.
Fain, 195 U. S. 165 (1904); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 1 (1906).
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superior tribunal, and that is the rule which permits the court
to comment on the evidence, a thing forbidden in most state
courts."0
In answer to this objection, it may be said in the first
place that the desirability of having an appointive bench
with power to comment on the evidence is far from settled.
The very fact that this difference does exist between state
and federal courts indicates that it is a debatable question.
But even if we assume that it is desirable, then the conclusion is, not so much that the proposed legislation should be
defeated, as that bills should be introduced in the state legislatures and constitutional amendments proposed, giving the
state courts these alleged advantages.
With respect to the first class of arguments, it may, therefore, be said that out of the four objections which the opponents of the proposed legislation have raised, there is one,
and only one, that has real merit, and that is that the original reason for diversity jurisdiction still exists.
If now we pass to the other class of arguments stating the
advantages of the proposed change, we find that they resolve
themselves into objections to diversity jurisdiction as it is
exercised today. 1.

CONGESTION OF THE FEDERAL DOCKET

One of these arguments is that something must be done
to relieve the congestion of the federal court docket. That
there is need of some new legislation, not only to relieve the
present congestion, but to prevent it in the future, seems
generally agreed. To what extent the abolition of diversity
jurisdiction would bring this relief obviously depends on
how much time the federal courts are now spending in trying cases that come to them because of diverse citizenship.
On this point, we have no reliable statistics. Some authorities
80 Brown, The Jurisdition 'of the Federal Courts Based on Di1versity of
Citizenship, 78 UNxv. PA. L. REv. 179, 183.
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estimate that the federal courts spend one-third of their
time in that way; others place it as low as five per cent.81
But even if we accept the higher estimate, there are other
and simpler ways of relieving the congestion; either by increasing the number of judges or by curtailing their jurisdiction. Congress has in fact at various times adopted both
of these methods. The Judicial Code of 1911 raised the jurisdictional amount to $3,000 and denied jurisdiction based
on the assignment of a chose in action, unless the jurisdiction
existed before the assignment.8" It prohibited the federal
courts from enjoining any action in the state courts;88 also,
it prohibited the removal of cases arising under the Federal
Employers Liability Act. 84 Other restrictions were created
by judicial construction. In a very early case,85 where there
were several plaintiffs and several defendants, the rule was
laid down that even though there was diversity of citizenship
between some of the plaintiffs and some of the defendants,
the case could not be removed, if there was one plaintiff and
one defendant who were citizens of the same state. It is
also well-settled that the District of Columbia is not a
"state" within the meaning of the constitutional provision
and consequently residents of that jurisdiction cannot get
into the federal court on the ground of diverse citizenship.8"
There is another suggestion for the relief of congestion in
the federal courts, made in a joint statement by the members of the University of Chiago Law Faculty in November,
1932, which is interesting because of what has happened
since then. That learned body suggested 87 that the conges81 Frankfurter, supra note 13, at 523; Newlin, supra note 20, at 404; Frankfurter, A Note on Diversity Jurisdiction--In Reply to Professor Yntema, 79
UNiv. PA. L. Rzv. 1097; Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 28
Iu. L. Rav. 356, 364.
82

36 STAT. 1091 (1911).

88 36 STAT. 1162 (1911).
84
85

36 STAT. 291 (1910).
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (1806).

36 Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445 (1805). See, also, The Corporation of New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91 (1816).
87 Comment, 31 MIci. L. Rzy. 59, 63."
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tion might be considerably relieved by repealing the Eighteenth Amendment.
Hence, the answer to this argument is that while the proposed legislation would no doubt relieve the congestion to
some extent, the same result can be more easily accomplished
without abolishing diversity jurisdiction.
2. THE UNFAIRNESS OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
It has sometimes been argued that diversity jurisdiction
works unfairly. This is an argument made by the Senate
Judiciary Committee in recommending the passage of the
Norris bill at the last Congress 8s and also by Mr. Frankfurter. 9 A resident of a state, when suing another resident of
the same state must sue in the state court, whereas a nonresident suing the same defendant, has his choice between
the federal court and the state court, even when there is no
federal question involved. But the answer made by the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the American
Bar Association seems complete. Such choice or privilege is
not in any way unfair or objectionable since it is entirely
reciprocal. When a person is sued in the courts of his own
state, if the nonresident plaintiff has no objection to that
jurisdiction, he should havee none.4 Furthermore, as has been
pointed out by both Judge Parker 41 and Professor Yntema,42
this choice or privilege is due, not to the jurisdictional provision, but to the removal statute. Obviously, the remedy for
any unfair discrimination is to amend the removal statute,
so as to give the resident the right to remove the case.
3.

HuMAN RIGHTS
Another argument against diversity jurisdiction is that
"it makes property rights more valuable than human
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND

38 69 CONG. REc. 8079.
89 Frankfurter, supra note 13, at 524.
40 14 Am. BAR ASS'N. JouR. 267; Parker, supra note 20. at 438.
41 Parker, supra note 20, at 438.
42 Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Controversies Between Citizens of Different States, 19 AM. BAR ASS'N. JOUR. 71, 73.
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rights," 4 because criminal actions are not removable; that
is, if he is sued in action which merely involves his property
rights, he can remove the case to the federal court, but if
he is sued in an action involving his life and liberty, the case
is not removable. This argument, which seems to be the
original contribution of Senator Norris to the discussion, is
ingenious, but based upon the false 'assumption that the defendant in any case has a better chance of escaping liability
in the federal court than in the state court and hence to
deny the defendant a valuable "human right." Moreover, it
ignores the fundamental distinction between civil and criminal actions. In civil suits only the rights of the plaintiff and
defendant are directly involved, whereas in a criminal action, it is the right of the accused as against all the other
citizens of the state. The state, in prosecuting the action and
in seeking to determine whether the accused has violated its
criminal law, acts in its sovereign capacity in behalf of all
the people of the state. This is a sufficient reason for making a distinction between civil and criminal cases and amply
justifies the constitutionl provision of Article 3, requiring
the trial of a criminal to be held in the state where the crime
was committed.
4. UNiFonmrry
One of the strongest objections to diversity jurisdiction,
as it is exercised today under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,4 ' is that it creates the great confusion and conflict between the judicial tribunals authorized to declare the law of
the state. According to the doctrine of this case, which has
been adhered to since Justice Story laid it down in 1842, in
*any case in the federal court where the decision does not depend directly on the construction of a state statute, the court
-is free to declare what the law of the state is, irrespective
48 Yntema and Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jursdiction, 79
UNIV. PA. L. REv. 869, 878.
44 16 Pet. 1 (1842).
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of state decisions. And this doctrine was expanded in the
later, hardly less well-known case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque."
There it is held that if a state supreme court has rendered a
decision construing a state statute, the court is bound by that
decision; but if the state supreme court in a later case, overrules its previous decision, the federal court is not bound by
the overruling decision, but is free to adhere to the case that
has been overruled. Thus, we have the intolerable situation
of having two courts in the same state, equally competent and
authoritative, flatly contradicting each other as to what the
law of the state is. Take, for instance, the very point involved
in Swift v. Tyson--whether a precedent debt is valuable
consideration, so that if a person takes a note in payment of
a precedent debt, he can be regarded as a holder for value.
According to the New York law, as expounded by the New
York courts, it is not a valuable consideration; according to
the New York law as expounded by the federal courts, it is
a valuable consideration. But the most striking illustration
of this anomalous situation is the more recent and interesting Kentucky Taxicab case," in which, as one writer indignantly expresses it,4 the proud State of Kentucky "saw
the firm hand of the Supreme Court immolate the public policy of the state upon the altar of a misconceived and doubtful doctrine." In that case a Kentucky taxicab company
wished to make a contract with a railroad company, by which
the railroad company would give it the exclusive privilege
of maintaining a cab stand on the railway property. Now the
Kentucky courts had repeatedly declared such contracts to
be void as opposed to the public policy of the State; but the
taxicab company thought that if it could get into a federal
court, it would find a more favorable construction of the
Kentucky law. The stockholders, therefore, dissolved the
company and reincorporated in Tennessee. Then, as a Ten45
46

1 Wall. 175 (1863).

47

Johnson, State Law and the Federal Cozits, 17 Ky. L. JOUR. 355.

Black and White T. &T. Co. v. Brown and Yellow T. &T. Co., 276 U.S.
518 (1928).
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nessee corporation, they came back into Kentucky and made
the desired contract with the railroad company. When the
defendant interfered with the exclusive privilege granted by
the contract, the taxicab company began injunction proceedings in the federal court which held, in direct contradiction to the decision of the Kentucky Court, that, under the
Kentucky law, the contract was perfectly valid. And the decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
Now, it should be freely conceded that such a situation is
highly undesirable and that there can never be uniformity
of decision between state and federal court, as long as the
rule of Swift v. Tyson prevails. But the simple answer to
the problem is that the remedy lies in in the abrogation of
the rule, not in the abolition of diversity jurisdiction.
5.

CORoATE CrZNSHIP

This taxicab case also very well illustrates the fifth objection to diversity jurisdiction, as it is exercised under the
rule of corporate citizenship. Under that rule, a corporation
is regarded as a citizen, not of the state where it does business, but of the state where it is incorporated.48 This of
course enables a corporation, when sued in a state where it
actually does business, to remove the case to the federal
court, simply because it is chartered in another state. "No
single factor" says Mr. Charles Warren, 9 in referring to this
rule, "has given rise to more friction and jealousy between
state and federal courts, or to more state legislation conflicting with and repugnant to federal jurisdiction.. ." The case
most frequently cited as illustrating the evil results of this
rule is the already mentioned Kentucky Taxicab case.50 But
48 The Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How.
497 (1844); Rundle v. The Delaware and Raritan Canal Co., 14 How. 80 (1852);
Marshall v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 16 How. 314 (1853); The

Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 (1855); Covington Drawbridge
Co. v. Shepherd, 20 How. 227 (1857); Ohio & Miss. R. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1
Black 286 (1861).

49 Warren, -upra note 5, at 90.
5o Op. cit. supra note 46.
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here again the answer is obvious. If this rule of the federal
courts results in a great abuse of its jurisdiction, the remedy
is to abolish the rule, not to destroy the jurisdiction. This
was in fact the remedy recommended by President Hoover
in his message to Congress in March, 1932, and given concrete form in the Mitchell Bill in the last Congress.51
There may be other arguments than these, but I think it
will be found that the nine here enumerated are the most
important. The purpose of this article was to state and
briefly discuss the chief arguments for and against the proposed legislation and to make it clear that although evils do
exist and reform is necessary, it can easily be accomplished
without any such radical measure as the total abolition of
diversity jurisdiction.
William Sternberg.
Creighton University, School of Law.

51

Ball, supra note 31, at 375.

